Firms Contracts And Financial Structure Pdf

firms contracts and financial structure pdf

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The paper examines the relationship betweenownership structure and value of the largestEuropean firms. If the largest owner is a family or a singleindividual, ownership concentration has noeffect on firm value, and the effect isnegative if the largest owner is a governmentorganisation. Firm value is found to have apositive feedback effect on ownershipconcentration except for governments, whichhold higher stakes in low-value firms. Inother words, owner-identity matters,particularly in a Continental Europeaninstitutional setting where ownershipconcentration is high and minority investorprotection is low.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Rent this article via DeepDyve. Alchian, A. Google Scholar. Arnold, J. Moizer and E. Arrow, K. Print Office, Washington DC. Baker-Collins, M. Barza, F. Becht eds. Baums, T. Buxbaum and K. Hopt eds. Becht, M. Barza and M. Blair, M. Bertrand, M. Mehta and S. Brown, K. Harlow and L. Burkart, M. Panuzi and A. Discussion Paper Number Cable, J. Caves, R. Chaganti, R. Chandler, A. The Dynamics of Industrial Enterprise. Charkham, J.

Cho, M. Coase, R. Cohen, S. Daily, C. De Angelo, H. Del Guercio, D. Demsetz, H. Dewenter, K. Novaes and R. D'souza J. Eckel, C. Edwards, J. Fama, E. Foss, N. Lando and S. Gedajlovich, E. Ghemmavat, P. Gomez-Mejia, L. Nunez-Nickel and I. Gorriz, C. Grannovetter, M. Gugler, K.

Han, K. Hansmann, H. Hart, O. Shleifer and R. Hausman, W. Himmelberg, C. Hubbard and D. Holderness, C. Hoshi, T. Kashyap and D. Hoskisson, R. Johnson, D. Yui and W. Hitt, R. Freeman and J. Harrison eds. Hou, K. Robertson: , Towards a Property Rights view of Ownership. Working Paper. Hundley, G. Jaihua, C. James, H. Jayaraman, N. Khorana, E. Nelling, J. Jensen, M. Johnson, W. Macgee, N. Nagarajan and H. Kester, C. Khanna, T. Kole, S. La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Laffont, J.

Lakonishok, J. Shleifer, R. Thaler and R. Lins, K. Loderer, C. Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Maug, E.

Pecking order theory for government finance

The paper examines the relationship betweenownership structure and value of the largestEuropean firms. If the largest owner is a family or a singleindividual, ownership concentration has noeffect on firm value, and the effect isnegative if the largest owner is a governmentorganisation. Firm value is found to have apositive feedback effect on ownershipconcentration except for governments, whichhold higher stakes in low-value firms. Inother words, owner-identity matters,particularly in a Continental Europeaninstitutional setting where ownershipconcentration is high and minority investorprotection is low. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

In economic theory, the field of contract theory can be subdivided in the theory of complete contracts and the theory of incomplete contracts. The incomplete contracting paradigm was pioneered by Sanford J. Grossman , Oliver D. Hart , and John H. In their seminal contributions, Grossman and Hart , Hart and Moore , and Hart argue that in practice, contracts cannot specify what is to be done in every possible contingency.

This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents. The first part of the book is concerned with the boundaries of the firm. The book describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—based on the idea that power and control ma The book describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—based on the idea that power and control matter when contracts are incomplete. Asset ownership becomes an essential source of power.

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

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Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

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