File Name: wittgenstein on rules and private language an elementary exposition .zip
So another person cannot understand the language. What Wittgenstein had in mind is a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others.
- Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
- Do the right thing! Rule finitism, rule scepticism and rule following
- Wittgenstein´s “Private Language Argument” According to Kripke
Published February 1, by Blackwell Publishing Limited. Written in English. In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule.
Rule following is often made an unnecessary mystery in the philosophy of social science. One form of mystification is the issue of 'rule finitism', which raises the puzzle as to how a learner can possibly extend the rule to applications beyond those examples which have been given as instruction in the rule. Despite the claim that this problem originated in the work of Wittgenstein, it is clear that his philosophical method is designed to evaporate, not perpetuate, such problems.
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
What Kripke has achieved, I think, is the first successful translation of what Wittgenstein was saying into the idiom of the contemporary Anglo--American mainstream in philosophy He not only drew the logical consequences of ordinary beliefs, but also solved intricate problems in mathematics. As a child prodigy, he was presented by his father to distinguished mathematicians and philosophers, who were overwhelmed by his talents. His father introduced him at the age of 15 to a group of eminent mathematicians, headed by Haskell B. Kripkea s boyhood genius did not flicker out in the s, when he studied at Harvard, Oxford, Princeton and Rockefeller University or, more accurately, when he worked independently at these institutions and had occasional contact with his surroundings.
Do the right thing! Rule finitism, rule scepticism and rule following
In Philosophical Investigations —94, Wittgenstein draws a notorious analogy between the working of a machine and the application of a rule. According to the view of rule-following that Wittgenstein is criticizing, the future applications of a rule are completely determined by the rule itself, as the movements of the machine components are completely determined by the machine configuration. On what conception of the machine is such an analogy based? In this paper, I intend to show that Wittgenstein relied on quite a specific scientific tradition very active at the beginning of the twentieth century: the kinematic or the general science of machines. To explain the fundamental tenets of this line of research and its links with Wittgenstein, I focus on Franz Reuleaux — , whose works were known to Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein´s “Private Language Argument” According to Kripke
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is a book by philosopher of language Saul Kripke in which he contends that the central argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein 's Philosophical Investigations centers on a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of our ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" p. He argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox, but accepts it and offers a "skeptical solution" to alleviate the paradox's destructive effects. While most commentators accept that the Philosophical Investigations contains the rule-following paradox as Kripke presents it, few have concurred in attributing Kripke's skeptical solution to Wittgenstein.